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THE CITY OF CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER AND
THE SUPREME COURT: Two MINORITIES MOVE
TOWARD ACCEPTANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The plight of this nation's mentally retarded citizens was brought to
the fore recently by the United States Supreme Court in the case of City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.' On its face, Cleburne is simply the
Court's affirmation of a renewed societal awareness of one of the forgotten minorities in the United States, and the next logical step in a judicial
process which guarantees that this group will have an adequate and fair
opportunity to assimilate into the mainstream of our culture. 2 However,
the case indicates a noticeable shift in the undercurrent ofjudicial interpretation practiced by the Burger court. More specifically, the traditional method ofjudicial review is perhaps being supplanted by a newer
model of equal protection analysis.
This Comment will highlight the growing dissatisfaction with the
inconsistency and rigidity of the traditional standard of review, and will
probe the Cleburne decision in order to gain valuable insight into both
the direction of the Court and the future of the equal protection doctrine. Particular attention will be focused on the concurring opinion of
Justice Stevens, an individual who shows increasing signs of leadership
on a Court which lacks direction.
II.
A.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE -

AN OVERVIEW

HistoricalBackground
Equality andjustice are synonymous: to bejust is to be equal, to be unjust
is to be unequal.
3

Aristotle
To say that equal protection has undergone a significant metamorphosis in the course of the Twentieth Century would certainly be an
understatement. From its humble origins in the fourteenth amendment, 4 as the most deferential form ofjudicial scrutiny 5 focusing merely
1. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. Professionals within the area of mental retardation have developed the concept of
"normalization" to define the goal and process of helping retarded citizens lead a "normal" life. Achievement of this goal involves undoing the multitude of formal restrictions
placed on retarded citizens, such as, restrictions on residence, education, and the right to
marry. See Chambers, The Principeof the Least Restrictive Alternative: The ConstitutionalIssues,
in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIrrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 486-487 (1976).
3. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA EUDEMIA VII § 1241(b) (W. Ross ed. 1925).

4. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Justice Holmes noted that equal protection was "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments ....
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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on legislative means, 6 the equal protection clause was transformed during the Warren era and particularly in the political and intellectual explosiveness of the 1960's. Equal protection literally became a symbol
for combatting unjust governmental classifications of persons. While
the Supreme Court did not dispose of the minimal standard of review, it
developed a much stronger level of scrutiny to delve into the social inequalities that plagued the American culture, most notably, racial discrimination. 7 Additionally, the advent of "new" equal protection
required a closer relationship between the legislative classification and
its purpose - careful scrutiny of the goals of the particular legislation. 8
"New" equal protection, strict scrutiny under the Warren Court,
developed into strands. First, strict scrutiny would be appropriate
where a legislative classification burdened "a fundamental right or interest." 9 Second, a more intensive review was applied where the presence
of a "suspect classification" necessitated intervention into inequities in
governmental categorization of a group of persons. 10
Although the legacy of "new" equal protection under the Warren
Court passed to its successor, the Burger Court has been reluctant to
adopt the spirit of hope and anticipation which permeated the Warren
Court. In fact, the Burger Court has taken a "thus far and no further"
stance with regard to equal protection." Although the Supreme Court
still adheres to the traditional model, it has not been as loyal to the bifurcated system as it may have envisioned. For instance, the Court today
utilizes a three-tiered approach, having inserted a middle tier of heightened or intermediate scrutiny. 12 This intermediate level of scrutiny has
6. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 670 (10th ed. 1980). Professor Gunther cites
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[I]nvocation of the equal protection clause.., does not disable any governmental body
from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact."), as indicative of the fact that "old" equal protection emphasized only the rationality of classifications, not the objectives of the legislature.
7. Thus the Warren Court adhered to a rigid "two-tiered" model of review: the
"older" rational basis test, or deferential standard of review; and strict scrutiny, the aggressive brand of review. Borrowing a phrase from Professor Gunther, strict scrutiny was
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; whereas old equal protection used " 'minimal' scrutiny
in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
8. GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 671.
9. Fundamental rights or interests protected by the Court include: Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the political franchise of voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (freedom of interstate migration); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(the right to criminal appeals).
10. Suspect classifications triggering strict scrutiny are limited to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); ancestry or national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (resident aliens
could not be denied welfare benefits). One should note however that the Court's scrutinization of alienage classifications has wavered in recent years, especially where governmental functions are involved. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
11.

GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 672.

12. Of critical importance in this commentary are the limitations imposed on the
equal protection clause by the Burger Court. Therefore, it may be prudent to identify the
adjectival phraseology which distinguishes the three levels of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is
the most intense level of review, requiring that a classification be necessary to achieve a
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clearly affected classifications based upon gender,' 3 alienage,' 4 and
illegitimacy. 15
Another significant change, under the Burger Court is a new perspective on the "old" equal protection standard. Where social and economic legislation had been perfunctorily sustained under "old" equal
protection, the Burger Court has been increasingly willing to invalidate
legislation using the supposedly deferential rational basis test, in what
has been termed new "bite" for the "traditionally toothless minimal
scrutiny standard."16
Therefore, equal protection clearly is no longer "a last resort of
constitutional arguments," but has developed into a concept overshadowing the express language of the fourteenth amendment. Therein lies
the source of the doctrinal confusion which pervades the Court's equal
protection analysis. The Supreme Court, in essence, created an ideal
which may be reflected only in specific instances before the Court.
Thus, the Burger Court is left to examine each problem confronting a
disadvantaged class on a case by case method.
B.

Growing Discontent With the Present Status of Equal Protection

While the Warren Court ushered in a new age of equal protection
analysis, the transition was not completely welcomed into the arms of
jurisprudential thought. True, the emergence of the intermediate level
of scrutiny seemed to pacify some critics of the bifurcated model; however, the result of the middle tier of review has been merely to create an
interventionist tool for making so-called "just" decisions without extending the analysis beyond the importance of the personal interest or
the value of the legislative end.1 7 Therefore, equal protection has come
under attack from various groups and, as a result, has led to further
factionalization on the Court and a corresponding reduction in
deliberation. 18
Justice Marshall figures most prominently in the mounting dissatisfaction with the multi-tiered system of review. In a series of dissenting
opinions beginning in 1970,19justice Marshall has called for a reexamicompelling governmental interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). Middlelevel scrutiny demands that the means chosen by the state must be substantially related to
achievement of an important governmental objective or end. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). Finally, the rational basis test is the most deferential and relaxed standard, whereby the Court will uphold any classification rationally related to an articulated
legitimate state interest. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17
(1973).
13. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illegal aliens).
15. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
16. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mfodel for a

Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972). See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
17.

Seeburger, The Muddle of the Aliddle Tier: The Coming Crisisin Equal Protection,48 Mo.

L. REV. 587, 616 (1983).
18. Id. at 615.
19. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Mar-
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nation of the Warren Court model, with its Burger Court modifications, 20 and reformulation of an appropriate method of review. He has
suggested a "sliding scale" analysis, whereby the level of scrutiny would
be adjusted along a multifactored spectrum depending on the invidiousness of the governmental classification, the "relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive," and the strength of the interests asserted by
the state in defense of the classification. 2 1 In Chicago Police Department v.
Mosley, 2 2 justice Marshall proposed a single standard which consolidated
the tiers of review into one question appropriate in all equal protection
cases; that is, is there "an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment?" 23 One need only look to the
Court's subsequent refinement of the intermediate standard to determine the less than enthusiastic response of the Court toward Justice
Marshall's opinion in Mosley.
A number ofJustices, including those outside Justice Marshall's liberal bloc, have also shown their dissatisfaction with the multi-tiered approach. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Craigv. Boren, 24 the first case to
articulate the intermediate level of scrutiny, opposed heightened scrutiny on the literalist ground that "the Equal Protection Clause contains
no such language, and none of our previous cases adopt that standard."12 5 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist observed that the Court has "had
enough difficulty with the two standards of review.., to counsel weight'2 6
ily against the insertion of still another 'standard' between those two."
Justice Stevens, writing a concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, argued for a single standard of review for, after all, there "is only one
Equal Protection Clause."'2 7 Responding to Justice Rehnquist's adherence to the two-tiered approach, Justice Stevens commented that
"whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that
there are at least three such standards applies with the same force to a
double standard." '28 Justice Stevens, sounding much like Justice Marshall, was inclined to believe that equal protection analysis "does not
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a
method the Court has employed to explain decisions that apply a single
29
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."
shall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. Even with the addition of a third level of review, Justice Marshall remains critical
of the present system of equal protection review. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231
(1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
21. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
23. Id. at 95.
24. 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 211 (Stevens,J., concurring).
28. Id. at 212 (Stevens,].. concurring).
29. Id.
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Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the Court's discontent
with the multi-level approach is its frequent departure from it. The
Court implements several means for achieving this result. First, the
Court may vary the strength of the tests used to review the law. 30 For
example, the Court may upgrade minimal scrutiny or downgrade intermediate scrutiny to either invalidate or uphold governmental objectives,
respectively. 3 1 Second, the Court has been known to create exceptions
to strict scrutiny through judicial sophistry in order to bypass a heightened standard of review. 3 2 For example, although the Court has accorded special constitutional protection to aliens through use of strict
scrutiny, it has recently exempted alienage classifications from the most
intensive review when they relate to matters "firmly within a state's con33
stitutional prerogatives."
III.

A.

CITY OF CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

Factual Background and the Lower Courts' Response

The genesis of this decision was a zoning dispute in which the City
3 4
of Cleburne, Texas, pursuant to its comprehensive zoning ordinance,
30. The Court utilizes various techniques for altering the standard of review. First,
the less drastic means or least restrictive alternatives theory requires that the legislature
impose restrictions that result in the least intrusion upon individual rights. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
770 (1977). Second, the actual state interest theory requires the legislature to show an
actual justification for imposition of a restriction. Therefore, the Court will not accept
rationalizations concocted solely for litigation purposes, see, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 270 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
Third, rational basis testing counters the actual state interest theory in that it involves
hypothesizing by the Court, hence the Court may accept any rationalization which conceivably justifies a challenged law. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 307 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
Last, the Court may incorporate "deed-intent translocation" to repair constitutional peculiarities in legislation which causes unintended violations of equal protection. Comment,
Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REV. 407, 432-34 n.213 (1983); see, e.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
31. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 166-69 (1984). Professor Shaman cites United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) as examples of the Court's technique of upgrading minimal scrutiny. The Court critically
examines governmental objectives, i.e., rejects the legitimate purpose, in order to invalidate the legislation. Alternatively, the Court may not grant wide latitude to governmental
means, thereby striking down legislation using minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Furthermore, the Court has taken at least one
occasion to downgrade intermediate scrutiny in.
order to sustain a classification usually
deserving a heightened level of scrutiny. Thus, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 468 (1981), Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion succeeded in upholding a genderbased classification which made only males criminally liable for statutory rape by reducing
intermediate scrutiny to a level "somewhat" sharper than the rational basis standard.
32. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 161, 170-72 (1984).
33. Id. at 172. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291. 296 (1978) (quoting Sugarman v.
Dugare, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
34. Under Section 8 of the ordinance, the following uses are permitted in a district
zoned R-3, the district in which the Featherston Street home is situated: any use permitted
in District R-2; apartment houses or multiple dwellings; boarding and lodging houses;
fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories; apartment hotels; hospitals, sanitariums,
nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other than for the insane or feeble

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

required Jan Hannah, owner of the house and lot located at 201
Featherston Street in Cleburne, to obtain a special use permit for operation of the house as a group home for the mentally retarded. 3 5 Hannah,
acting on behalf of Cleburne Living Center (CLC), purchased the building in July, 1980, with the express intention of establishing and operating a group home for thirteen mentally retarded adults in the moderate
to mild range of retardation.3 6 OnJuly 28, 1980, Hannah applied to the
City for the special use permit, but on August 18, 1980, the City's Planning and Zoning Commission voted to deny the permit. The City Council, at a public hearing concerning the permit application, denied the
37
permit by a vote of three to one.
CLC and Hannah brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas against the City, alleging equal protection violations committed against them and potential residents of the
home. The district court found that the availability of group homes in
the community was an "essential ingredient of normal living patterns"
for mentally retarded persons and that the denial of the permit was
"motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home would be
persons who are mentally retarded." 38 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the permit on its face was constitutional and that the Council's denial of the permit was constitutional. After deciding that the
ordinance had no impact on a fundamental right and that mental retardation was not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, the court applied
a weak standard of review. 39 Therefore, emphasizing the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, the safety and fears of the residents in the
adjoining neighborhood, and the number of people to be housed in the
home as legitimate interests of the city, the court found the ordinance
rationally related to the interests, and not "arbitrary, capricious, or
minded or alcoholics or drug addicts; private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose
chief activity is carried on as a business; philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other
than penal institutions; and accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses.
Section 16, subsection 9 of the zoning ordinance requires the issuance of an annual special
use permit for: "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts,
or penal or correctional institutions." Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726
F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1984).
35. The group home, classified as a Level 1 Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded would be subject to extensive federal and state regulations and guidelines.
105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.2 (1985).
36. Roughly 89% of retarded persons are categorized as "mildly" retarded, meaning
their IQ is between 50 and 70. "Moderately" retarded persons have an IQ between 35
and 50. A small minority of retarded persons are either "severely" retarded (IQbetween
20 and 35) or "profoundly" retarded (IQ under 20). Id. at 3256 n.9.
37. City Council members considered the following factors in their decision to deny
the special use permit: "(a) the attitude of a majority of owners of property located within
two hundred (200) feet of 201 Featherston; (b) the location of a junior high across the
street from 201 Featherston; (c) concern for the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood; (d) the size of the home and the number of people to be housed; (e) concern over
the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions which the mentally retarded residents might
take; (f) the home's location on a five hundred (500) year flood plain; and (g) in general,
the presentation made before the City Council." 726 F.2d at 202.
38. Cleburne, Joint App. at 94, Findings 30, 28.
39. Id. at 102-103.
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irrational."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 4 1
finding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and
that, under heightened scrutiny, the zoning ordinace was invalid on its
face and as applied because it did not substantially further any important
governmental interest. The Fifth Circuit relied on the indicia of suspectness identified in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4 2 to
conclude that, first, mentally retarded persons have been subject to a
history of grotesque mistreatment which has led to popular fears and
uncertainty; 4 3 second, mentally retarded people have been relegated to
a position of political powerlessness; 44 and third, mental retardation is
an immutable condition deserving of special consideration. 45 The court
hinted that the mentally retarded may be a "discrete and insular" minority meriting protection. 4 6 The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to apply the
heightened standard of scrutiny, rejecting all of the objectives posited
by the City in defense of the ordinance and all the factors which influenced the Council's decision to deny the permit.
B.

The Response of the United States Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion

The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, 4 7 sent a mixed
message to the developmentally disabled and the advocates who championed their cause, leaving the taste of a bittersweet victory. On one
hand, the Supreme Court voted nine to zero that the special use permit
requested by the Cleburne Living Center (CLC) and Jan Hannah was
unconstitutional. At the same time, this substantial triumph for CLC
was marred by the Court's decision, in a vote of six to three, that people
with mental retardation are not entitled to be recognized as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class deserving the special constitutional protection of
heightened scrutiny. Observers of constitutional trends received a similarly mixed signal from the Court and bore witness to the rare phenomenon of rationality with bite4 8 when the Court struck down the ordinance
as providing no rational relation to the City's legitimate interests.
Justice White began his analysis with an overview of past equal protection cases in an attempt to reaffirm the Court's adherence to the
40. Id. at 103.
41. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
43. 726 F.2d at 197.
44. Id. at 197-98.
45. Id. at 198.
46. Id. This criterion is taken from Justice Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
47. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
48. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

multi-tiered standard of review. 4 9 He set the tone of the decision by
indicating that "[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide latitude.., and the Constitution presumes that even important decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes." '50 Armed with this constitutional
premise, Justice White foreshadowed his ultimate conclusion by noting
that deferential treatment based on age had yet to be accorded interme51
diate scrutiny.
Against this background, the majority concluded that mental retardation would receive the treatment normally accorded any other classification based on social and economic legislation. Justice White advanced
several arguments to support his decision. First, mentally retarded persons' reduced ability to cope with the everyday world legitimizes the
state's interest in dealing with and protecting them. 52 Moreover, mental
retardation covers such a broad array of conditions 53 that decisions on
how to treat retarded people are best left to legislators aided by quali54
fied professionals, and not the judiciary.
Justice White's second point stresses the recent legislative solutions
to the problems facing the mentally retarded at both the federal and
state levels that "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." 5 5 The
abundance of legislation, for Justice White, reflects the undeniable distinction between retarded persons and others. 5 6 Therefore, the approval of such legislation indicates that governmental, and not judicial,
consideration of the differences should be the desirable end. Given the
"wide variation" in the abilities and needs of retarded persons, governmental bodies must be accorded some freedom in shaping their reme57
dial efforts.
Third, the significant legislative response to the needs of this group
persuaded Justice White that the mentally retarded were not politically
powerless. 58 This proposition is indeed ironic if one closely examines
the majority opinion. Previously, Justice White had cited the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 59 as reflecting the
affirmative response the legislature has taken toward the plight of the
mentally retarded citizen. However, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman60 (Pennhurst I), the Supreme Court concluded that the
rights provisions of the Act were merely advisory guidelines and not ab49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See generally Part II supra.
105 S. Ct. at 3254.
Id. at 3255.
Id. at 3256.
See supra note 36.
Id. at 3256.

55.

Id.

56. Id. at 3257.
57. Id.
58.

Id.

59. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1982).
60. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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solute obligations which could be enforced against the states. 6 ' Congress has yet to make these guidelines enforceable.
Last, Justice White predicted that if mental retardation was recognized as a quasi-suspect classification, then the floodgates would be
open for other groups with "immutable disabilities setting them off from
others" to claim special constitutional deference. 6 2 Instead of creating a
new quasi-suspect class, "we should look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general
matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us." ' 63 Therefore,
the majority settled on the rational relationship standard which afforded
government the latitude both to assist the retarded and to engage in
activities which would burden retarded persons in "incidental
matters."64
Surprisingly, despite use of the minimum level of scrutiny, the
Court invalidated the zoning ordinance insofar as it required a special
use permit for group homes. 6 5 Because the requirement of a special use
permit, as applied under the circumstances of this case, violated equal
protection of the laws, the Court did not decide whether the special use
permit was facially invalid where mentally retarded persons were concerned, leaving unanswered questions concerning the rights of mentally
retarded persons to live in the community. 6 6 The majority focused its
decision on the fact that the City required a special use permit for the
operation of a facility for the mentally retarded, while other uses, such as
hospitals, dormitories, and nursing homes for convalescents or the
aged, did not require a special use permit. Justice White concluded that
mentally retarded persons as a class may be different from those persons
occupying facilities permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit,
but the difference was "largely irrelevant" to any legitimate interests of
the City. 6 7 The record revealed no rational basis for the City of
Cleburne to believe that the group home posed any special threat to
68
legitimate interests of the City.
Justice White proceeded to specifically reject the factors upon which
the decision of the district court purportedly rested. First, and most significantly, the negative attitudes or fears of neighborhood residents,
"unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings,
and the like." 6 9 The City's concern for the location of the facility across
the street from a junior high school (itself attended by about 30 mentally
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 17.
105 S. Ct. at 3258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3258-60.

66. Id. at 3254 n.8. The Court in Cleburne refused to address the issue of "Single fam-

ily" zoning restrictions on group homes.
67. Id. at 3259.
68.

Id.

69. Id.
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retarded persons) and the fact that the home was situated on a 500 year
flood plain were quickly dismissed by Justice White as "vague, undifferentiated fears" especially when considered with the other dwellings sim70
ilarly situated which were not required to obtain the special permit.
Additionally, doubts raised by the City about the legal responsibility for
actions which the mentally retarded might take; the size of the home and
number of people that would occupy it; fire safety; congestion of the
streets; concentration of population; and the serenity of the neighborhood, failed to rationally justify singling out this particular group home
for a special permit when no restrictions were imposed on the other uses
71
freely permitted in the neighborhood.
Justice White ended his analysis by noting that the requirement of
the special use permit for the Featherston facility was based on an "irrational prejudice" against the mentally retarded. 72 Therefore, Cleburne is
certain to remain a useful precedent in attacks on zoning ordinances
which discriminate against the housing needs of people who are mentally retarded, especially where the fears and prejudices of neighbors lie
73
at the heart of the community's decision to exclude a group home.
2.

The Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote a separate
concurring opinion to express a shared view of equal protection analysis. Quite succinctly, Justice Stevens reaffirmed his opinion first expressed in Craigv. Boren 74 that equal protection cases have delineated
no separate, identifiable strands of review; but instead, reflect "a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one
75
extreme to 'rational basis' at the other."
In an interesting development, Justice Stevens focused on the special needs and limitations which the mentally retarded, and for that matter, any disadvantaged group could recognize in themselves., Thus,
there are many legitimate legislative decisions placing mentally retarded
persons in a special class, which although they disadvantage retarded
persons, are not presumptively irrational. 7 6 For example, restrictions
on a retarded person's right to operate an automoblile, which deprive
him of the employment opportunities and freedom to travel that other
citizens enjoy, seem rational. However, in this particular case, Justice
Stevens stated that the court of appeals was correct when it "observed
70.

Id.

71. Id. at 3259-60.
72. Id. at 3260.
73. Ellis & Luckasson, DiscriminationAgainst People with Mental Retardation: A Comment on
the Cleburne Decision, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 249, 251 (1985).

74. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
75. 105 S. Ct. at 3261. Justice Steven's reference to a "continuum ofjudgmental responses" is outwardly similar to the "sliding scale" analysis of Justice Marshall posited in
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-99, reh'gdenied,411 U.S. 959
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. 105 S. Ct. at 3262.
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that through ignorance and prejudice the mentally retarded 'have been
subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment.' 77
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's reasoning with regard to invalidation of the special use permit, concluding that "a rational member
of this disadvantaged class" would never "approve of the discriminatory
application of the City's ordinance in this case.''78
The Opinion of Justice Marshall

3.

Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, agreed
with the outcome of the case, but vigorously dissented from the majority's "novel and truncated" proposition that mentally retarded persons
were not entitled to a quasi-suspect classification. 79 The first part of
Justice Marshall's opinion amounted to a scathing criticism of Justice
White's majority decision. Justice Marshall initially raised two paradoxes in the majority decision: first, a discussion of heightened scrutiny
was superfluous to an invalidation of the zoning ordinance on rational
basis grounds; 80 and second, the Court, while labeling its decision a rational basis review had, in fact, utilized a heightened standard of review
dubbed "second order" rational basis - to declare the requirement
of a special use permit unconstitutional. 8 1
Justice Marshall continued, stating that normally "the burden is not
on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it has drawn are
sensible," yet in this case, the majority required a justification from the
City. 8 2 Additionally, under the traditional rational basis standard, the
Court does not rely on the record to judge whether policy decisions are
supported by a firm factual foundation. 83 In Justice Marshall's view, the
Cleburne majority, by refusing to acknowledge that a heightened standard
of review was being used, created a precedent for a rationale review, and
not a rational basis standard of review. The Supreme Court and lower
courts now have a license to search for rationales which support economic and commercial classifications in a manner similar to the dark
days of equal protection. 8 4 Furthermore, in failing to articulate the factors which justify invocation of this "second order" rational basis standard, Justice Marshall believes the majority has left the lower courts "in
the dark" as to when the more searching scrutiny is required.
The second part of Justice Marshall's opinion reiterated his longheld belief8 5 that "the level of scrutiny.., should vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and
the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular clas77. Id. at 3262 (quoting Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 197).
78. Id. at 3263.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 3264.
Id. at 3265.
Id. at 3264.
Id. at 3265. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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sification is drawn.' "86 He then set forth his test by which the zoning
law should be judged; that is, the ordinance should "be convincingly
justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes. '"87 Analyzing the case, Marshall found that mentally retarded
persons have a substantial interest in establishing group homes. 8 8 Second, mentally retarded persons have been subjected to a "grotesque"
history of segregation and discrimination based only on vague
generalizations. 8 9
Justice Marshall proceeded to reexamine the justifications used by
only to conclude that they could not
the majority to support its opinion,
"withstand logical analysis." 90 In spirited language, Justice Marshall
presented a forceful argument for judicial interventionism, since courts
"do not sit or act in a social vacuum." 9 1 Developing an evolving doctrine of constitutional equality, Justice Marshall advocated a Court which
advances, or "catalyzes," legislative changes that would constantly remain loyal to the fundamental undercurrent of equality running through
the law. 9 2 Justice Marshall then noted that the fact that mentally retarded persons are no longer politically powerless does not indicate that
they are no longer a group with special characteristics and needs. For
example, simply because legislation has been enacted to deal with racial
discrimination, does not mean that the Court has made race-based clas93
sifications any less suspect.
Justice Marshall continued by criticizing the two principles apparently central to the majority opinion. First, the belief that heightened
scrutiny is inapplicable where the individuals in a group are different
and that the legislature properly may take this into account, is unsound.
Women have distinctive characteristics, and yet heightened scrutiny applies to them. 94 Similarly, the fact that legislation affecting a group is
likely to be valid has no logical application to the denial of heightened
illegitiscrutiny, especially where similarly situated groups - women,
95
mates, and aliens - have the benefit of a higher standard.
Last, Justice Marshall expressed his concern that the majority
merely invalidated the ordinance as it applied to the respondents in this
case, and did not strike down the permit requirement on its face. He
dissented "from the novel proposition that 'the preferred course of adjudication' is to leave standing a legislative act resting on 'irrational prej86. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 99, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
87. 105 S. Ct. at 3265. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31 reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) (Marshall,J., concurring); see also, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
88. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266.
89. Id. at 3266-68.
90. Id. at 3268.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3268-69.
93. Id. at 3269.
94. Id. at 3269-70.
95. Id. at 3270-71.
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udice' . . . thereby forcing individuals in the group discriminated against
to continue to run the act's gauntlet." 9 6 In effect, the Court left unanswered questions for the future "[b]y leaving the sweeping exclusion of
'9 7
the 'feeble-minded' to be applied to other groups of the retarded."
Instead, facial invalidation of the ordinance's treatment of the mentally
retarded would have placed the responsibility for tailoring a new ordinance on the City of Cleburne. 98
IV.

THE COURT AFTER CLEBURNE: JUSTICE STEVENS' PRAGMATIC
STABILITY AMIDST THE REIGN OF CONFUSION

The discussion thus far has attempted to expose equal protection
adjudication as a constitutional procrustean bed which forces governmental classifications into three inflexible positions on an anachronistic
scale. Disenchantment with the multi-tiered standard of review has
transformed the equal protection clause into a talisman for the Court's
divination of legitimate state goals when weighed implicitly against the
interests of disadvantaged persons. In Cleburne, though, lies an inkling
of hope that the seeds of transition have been sown byJustice Stevens.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, summarized above, 9 9 is
therefore worthy of special attention in that it proposes a viable alternative to traditional equal protection.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens presages an increased
willingness by the Supreme Court to redefine equal protection. Indeed,
it is significant to note that the concurrences of Justices Stevens and
Burger, when grouped with the dissents of Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Blackmun, constitute a five Justice bloc which would not have applied the same quality of equal protection analysis as the Court. As a
result, the Court left the door open for the lower courts to apply a level
of review running the gamut from somewhere just below heightened
scrutiny to something a little more than the deference of the rational
basis standard.' 0 0
Admittedly, upon examination, Justice Stevens' early opinions in
the area of equal protection are as obfuscated as the opinions of the rest
of the Court. In Mathews v. Lucas,i0 l where the court upheld a classification scheme based on illegitimacy, Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued for
a more intensive scrutiny of legislative categorizations based on the
"habit" of considering illegitimates as undeserving of special protection. 10 2 Aside from a discomfort with the multi-tiered standard and a
fierce loyalty to traditionally disfavored groups, the Justice's dissent in
Lucas provided little insight into a unique interpretive philosophy. How96. Id. at 3272.
97. Id. at 3273.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
100. Summary, Analysis, and Commentary, 9 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., 242, 243 (1985).

101. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
102. Id. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ever, Craig v. Boren, 10 3 a case presenting a challenge to a statute which
set the minimum age for purchasing 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen for
women and age twenty-one for men, marked Justice Stevens' abandonment of the three-tiered system in favor of a "single standard" of review. 10 4 Although Justice Stevens' refusal to articulate a proper
standard of review may have frustrated those in search of a well-defined
judicial decree from on high, perhaps Boren foreshadowed a loftier purpose. Justice Stevens, in opting for a balancing approach, recognized
that attempting to define an appropriate standard is futile, 10 5 because
the range of potential "modes" of review between utter deference and
the strictest scrutiny is infinite.
Cleburne suggests that Justice Stevens finally has synthesized the
doctrinal threads running through the fabric of equal protection into a
workable theory destined to be implemented in Supreme Court practice.
More importantly, Cleburne reflects a dialectical progression by Justice
Stevens which transcends the muddled confusion that pervades equal
protection analysis. It is indeed prophetic that a man who has confused
conservatives, liberals, and scholars alike with his refusal to be typecast
should lead the Court from chaos into coherence.' 0 6 In a similar fashion, Justice Stevens has purposely avoided categorizing his approach to
equal protection, and therefore, it is difficult to label a test which the
Court and practitioners may employ in every equal protection case.
Some characteristics ofJustice Stevens' interpretive philosophy, though,
are readily identifiable and, in all likelihood, will be honed into a newer
equal protection.
First, Justice Stevens deliberately eschews the troika of traditional
standards in equal protection. In Cleburne, he stated that he has "never
been persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately explain the
decisional process."' 1 7 Second, theJustice has a "pronounced streak of
Frankfurterianism tempered by a willingness to apply the law vigorously" 10 8 in those areas where the rights and interests of a disadvantaged group outweigh countervailing interests of judicial restraint and
federalism. In other words, Justice Stevens engages in a "balancing of
interests" approach which determines the strength of conflicting interests - which presumably exist outside of the judge's mind - and balances them objectively.
Justice Stevens' balancing formula is three-pronged. First, an initial
determination of the character of the challenged governmental classification, as it relates to the class that has been allegedly harmed, is made.
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977).
104. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105. Special Project,justiceStevens: The First Three Terms, 32 VAND. L. REV. 671, 713-15
(1979).
106. Ball & Ulhman, JusticeJohn Prul Stevens: An Initial Assessment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV.
567, 569 (1978).
107. 105 S. Ct. at 3261.
108. Beytagh, Mr.Justice Stevens an.' the Burger Court's Uncertain Trumpet, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 946 (1976).
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Justice Stevens looks to either: the nature of the classification itself, that
is, if the class has been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor"' 10 9 as in
Cleburne and Lucas; or, the effect of the legislation on those persons affected by it, as in Zablocki v. Redhail.'I1 In Zablocki, the Court invalidated
a Wisconsin statute which provided that a resident "having minor issue
not in his custody and which he is under an obligation to support by any
court order" could not marry without court permission."' Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, concluded that although the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting children who were not in custody, the
statute, in effect, deliberately discriminated against the poor. Thus, Justice Stevens provides both a qualitative and quantitative aspect, respectively, to a determination of the character of a classification.
Second, after characterizing the classification, Justice Stevens considered whether the proffered legislative purpose was the actual basis
for the decision to create the restrictive classification. He concluded, in
Cleburne, that the proffered purpose for the requirement of an annual
special use permit - protection of the mentally retarded persons who
would live in the group home - was merely a guise for the actual basis,
the irrational fear and prejudice of the neighboring land owners.' 12
In theory, after satisfaction of the requirement of an actual purpose,
Justice Stevens' formula is applied to closely examine the justifications
urged to support the governmental action. Therefore, this third step
comprises the actual balancing of the state's legitimate purposes and the
interests of the disadvantaged group. Justice Stevens quickly concluded
in Cleburne that zoning ordinances are not usually justified by an unconvincing desire to protect mentally retarded persons from "the hazards
presented by the neighborhood." 1 3 This prong operates to discourage
legislative bodies from conjuring up unconvincing and irrational justifications solely in defense of challenges to a classification.' 14 Another
significant characteristic of Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis is
his redefinition of the term "rational" and the consequent bolstering of
the "old" rational relationship test.' 15 Cleburne advises that "rational
basis" demands a stronger showing by the legislature: that the classification be actually a legitimate interest of the state; and that, as applied,
the classification treat all whom it affects impartially.' 16
Moreover, the intellectual merit ofJustice Stevens' approach cannot
be overestimated. As mentioned above, Justice Stevens' opinion in
109. 105 S. Ct. at 3261. See Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalJursprudence ofJustice
Stevens, 46 U. Cil. L. REV. 155, 214 (1978).
110. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
111. Id. at 375.
112. 105 S. Ct. at 3262. See Special Project, supra note 105 at 714 ("[T]he principal
concern in Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis is finding an actual legislative purpose. If he finds none, the classification is invalid; if an actual legislative purpose is evident, he generally defers to it.").
113. 105 S. Ct. at 3263.
114. See Special Project, supra note 105 at 714.
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 3263.
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Cleburne represents a dialectical progression towards a workable reformulation of equal protection. If one reads Cleburne in the order of Justice White's majority opinion, then justice Marshall's dissent, and finally,
Justice Stevens' concurrence, the dialectical synthesis is self-evident. In
other words, Justice Stevens retained the best elements of both Justice
White's thesis - rationality with bite - and Justice Marshall's antithesis
- intermediate scrutiny - to develop a wide-ranged synthesis fully capable of filling the immeasurable void between the traditional tiers of
review, and thus competently adjudicate the broad scope of equal protection challenges intrinsic to this generation. For example, one of the
characteristics comprising intermediate scrutiny - the assessment of the
importance of the governmental interest - has been appropriated into
the first prong of Justice Stevens' balancing approach, the characterization of the governmental classification.1 7 This type of intellectual innovation is certain to distinguish Justice Stevens from the rest of the Court
and solidify a position of Court leadership and constructive influence.
However, one would be most neglectful in analyzing Justice Stevens' approach if one refused to unmask the inherent flaws in his argument. While Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis frees the Court
from the doctrinal confines of the three-tiered model, it gives no guidance to legislatures as to the limits of constitutionally permissible legislation.1 1 8 Another criticism of Justice Stevens' balancing approach,
which by its very nature contains elements of a more searching rational
basis test, is the potential for the Court to review an even broader array
of governmental classifications and thereby infringe upon that which is
properly within the legislative domain." 19
V.

CONCLUSION

Cleburne marks a transition in equal protection analysis. The divergent opinions ofJustices White and Marshall reflect the inconsistency of
the three-tiered model, and therefore, indirectly reinforce Justice Stevens' substitute method of review.
The decision is also noteworthy in that it signals a change in the
personality of the Court, guided by the pragmatism of Justice Stevens.
Cleburne reflects the shift of Justice Stevens from the undifferentiated
middle to the intellectual standard-bearer of the Court. Therefore, the
future of the Court appears much brighter if the skillfully structured
consistency of Justice Stevens can unseat the strong ideologies - both
liberal and reactionary - that constitute the Supreme Court.
Charles T. Passaglia

117. Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalJurisprudenceofJustice Stevens, 46 U.
155, 214 (1978).
118. Id. at 216.
119. Id.
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